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Abstract  
Conceptualized as early as 1920 by English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, but not 
formalized until later work in the 1970s and 1990s, “environmental charges” are a form 
of Pigouvian taxes that suggest the revenue burden of governance could be shifted from 
economic “goods” to environmental “bads”. While their association with Pigouvian taxes 
would suggest that environmental charges are applied as a policy instrument to encourage 
the reduction or elimination of environmental externalities, their application at the federal 
level in the United States suggests this is not the case. This report postulates that federally 
applied environmental charges accept environmental externalities as the status quo and 
are instead intended to recover the government’s cost in addressing the environmental 
externality.
1 
1. Introduction 
Controlling negative environmental externalities from industrial activities, such noxious 
smells from nearby leatherworks, has been a challenge for governments dating back to 
medieval times (see Zupko & Laures 1996). One proposed means of addressing these 
environmental externalities has been environmental charges, which is a general term for 
charges (e.g., taxes or fees) assessed on activities that produce environmental 
externalities (Repetto et al. 1992). This report postulates that despite their basis in 
Pigouvian concepts, as implemented at the federal level in the United States, 
environmental charges typically accept an environmental externality as the status quo and 
merely seek to recover the government’s cost in addressing the externality. 
The conceptual origin of environmental charges can be traced back to the 
correction of externalities as suggested by Pigou in 1920 (Pigou 1929). Formalization of 
the concepts occurred in the context of environmental economics in the 1970s, and later 
advocacy for environmental charges was part of a shift towards market-based approaches 
to environmental policies in the 1990s (Pearce 2002; Coglianese 2001). One of the 
arguments for environmental charges, and taxation in particular, developed in the 1990s 
was “shifting the revenue burden from economic ‘goods’ to environmental ‘bads’” 
(Repetto et al. 1992, p. 1), thus incentivizing environmentally positive actions (e.g., 
reducing waste) while at the same time allowing the government to capture the costs of 
managing any externalities that arise (e.g., pollution remediation) or fund other priorities. 
In addition to capturing these externalities, Repetto et al. (1992) argued that 
2 
environmental charges offer incentivization for consumers to adjust their behavior to 
avoid products or activities with taxes or fees. 
As a means of capturing negative externalities, environmental charges are a form 
of a Pigouvian tax (also spelled Pigovian tax), which are “taxes designed to correct 
inefficiencies of the price system that are due to negative external effects” (Sandmo 2018, 
p. 10312); and an optimal Pigouvian tax would be one that fully captures the damage in 
the assessed tax (Sandmo 2018). While defining this tax structure in “The Economics of 
Welfare”, Pigou (1929, p. 186 - 187) connects environmental externalities such as smoke 
being emitted from factory chimneys, to increased costs borne by the community for 
washing clothing or the necessity of artificial light due to haze. In the scenario presented 
by Pigou (1929), the smoke emitted by the factory offers a clear source and target upon 
which a tax can be accessed (i.e., point pollution). However, non-point sources of 
pollution (e.g., agricultural runoff) can have significant environmental impacts which 
may be difficult to target (Zaring 1996). Indeed, it has been noted that as applied to 
pollutants, the Pigouvian paradigm may only work when pollutants are “exceptional and 
occasional” (Repetto 1996, p. 53) as opposed to normal outputs of industrial processes. 
Accordingly, while Pigouvian taxes may ultimately seek to correct the social externalities 
due to a product, environmental charges, seek to capture the environmental externalities 
as a result of a product or service 
The idea that federally enacted environmental charges in the United States are 
intended for cost recovery, and not to discourage pollution, is not a novel idea and has 
been previously proffered by Fullerton (1996) who noted: 
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… in general, U.S. policy has not used “environmental taxes” for incentives to 
discourage pollution. The United States has no tax on vehicle emissions, no tax on 
smokestack emissions, and no tax on the generation or disposal of waste. Instead, 
actual policy has put great weight on the second objective – to collect from those 
responsible for pollution. (p. 35) 
 
Fullerton (1996) then proceeds to build upon this argument by noting that if the 
government’s objective is cost recovery then a small tax broadly applied could achieve 
the same goal without the administrative overhead associated with the individual taxes. 
Since the 1996 publication of Fullerton’s work, the landscape of “explicit” environmental 
taxes (i.e., labeled by the Internal Revenue Service as such) has contracted, but premise 
appears to be unchanged. This report builds upon the work of Fullerton (1996) by taking 
a closer look at policies that Fullerton identified as “implicit environmental taxes” and 
nominally expands upon that list. 
 The next section of this report provides a deeper background on environmental 
charges and briefly examines how environmental charges may be implemented with 
particular focus on taxes and fees. In Section 3 the core thesis of this report is examined 
in greater depth with federal programs implementing environmental taxes being 
examined to determine if they are structured for cost recovery. After this examination, the 
policy implications of environmental charges are discussed in Section 4 before the report 
concludes with Section 5. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Development of Environmental Charges 
English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877 – 1959) appears to have been the first to 
make the connection between negative environmental externalities, the impact to the 
public, and the possibility of recouping those externalities through the use of taxation in 
“The Economics of Welfare” (Pigou 1929). However, Pigou’s argument was predicated 
solely upon the presumption that society (i.e., individuals and businesses) is damaged by 
these externalities as opposed to the environment. Pigou presented this augment in the 
context of positive and negative social impacts. As an example of a positive externality, 
Pigou noted that uncompensated services were rendered when private parks are 
developed and the surrounding community enjoys cleaner air (Pigou 1929, p. 186). The 
author then contrasted a negative externality in which the surrounding community may be 
damaged by smoke emitted from a factory (Pigou 1929, p. 186). In contrast to positive 
externalities, which may be difficult to apply a financial value to thus rendering recovery 
difficult, negative externalities tend to result in clear financial burdens (e.g., the cost of 
doing extra laundry). As such, in order to correct the social cost of the negative 
externalities produced, Pigou suggested that the government can intervene using taxation 
to ensure that the social cost is corrected (Pigou 1929, p. 215 - 229). 
 The development of environmental economics in the 1970s, along with the 
adoption of concepts such as the polluter pays principle, led to a reexamination of 
Pigouvian taxes and how they could be applied in an environmental context (Pearce 
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2002). This reexamination was focused on considering how environmental externalities 
could be controlled (see Baumol & Oates 1971; Sandmo 1975); however, it remained 
unclear how Pigouvian taxes could reduce pollution until the Baumol (1972) released the 
seminal paper “On Taxation and the Control of Externalities” which argued a two-fold 
approach would produce an efficient allocation of resources (i.e., permissible levels of 
pollution). The approach called for first setting appropriate standards; followed by setting 
taxes or changes that were deemed to result in an acceptable level of pollution (Baumol 
1972). When properly implemented, the taxes would then result in an acceptable level of 
pollution regardless of the economic motivations of polluters. Baumol and Oates (1975) 
built upon the work of Baumol (1972) with the publication of “The theory of 
environmental policy” to argue in support of policymakers intervening in support of the 
maintenance or improvement of environmental conditions. In support of their argument, 
Baumol & Oates (1975) offered a theoretical analysis of externalities, based in part upon 
the work of Pigou, and offered various environmental taxes and subsidies as possible 
instruments for policymakers. However, this scholarship was balanced by concerns that 
environmental taxes were limited as long-term solutions to environmental externalities 
(Carlton & Loury 1980) and their application appeared sensitive to the size of the 
industry generating the pollution (Burrows 1979).  
 Following investigations of the 1970s a resurgence of interest was triggered by 
environmental advocacy groups shifting to “pragmatic strategies” (Coglianese 2001, p. 
107) being applied to environmental policies, such as advocacy of emissions trading as a 
market-based approach (Coglianese 2001). One prominent advocate was the World 
6 
Resources Institute, a non-profit research organization based in Washington, D.C., which 
released a series of publications exploring tax policy and economic incentives to reduce 
pollution and excessive energy use (Repetto et al. 1992, p. viii). One aspect of World 
Resources Institute work was advocating for the adoption of environmental charges, 
which the authors broadly defined as fees or taxes on environmentally damaging 
activities (e.g., release of water effluents) or products that entail an environmental cost 
(e.g., gasoline taxes) (Repetto et al. 1992, p. 72-73).  In the seminal report “Green Fees: 
How a Tax Shift Can Work for the Environment and the Economy” (Repetto et al. 1992), 
authors affiliated with World Resources Institute noted that “Switching some of the 
revenue burden from taxes on income, employment, and profits to environmental charges 
on resource waste, collection, and pollution would yield double economic benefits.” (p. 
11).  This is a reference to the double-dividend hypothesized for environmental levies 
(i.e., taxes or fees) which hypothesizes that, in addition to environmental benefits, broad 
economic benefits could be realized when environmental externalities were taxed (Freire-
González 2018). In addition to postulating that substituting green fees for other taxes 
would result in a double-divided, Repetto et al. (1992) also argued that the existing tax 
system, focused on income and profits at the federal level, is burdensome and may result 
in less revenue being collected. To support their argument, the authors noted that there is 
a sensitivity between the labor supply and taxes, arguing that a rise in after-tax hourly 
earnings would lead to a rise in hours worked (Repetto et al. 1992, p. 3).  
While Repetto et al. (1992) suggested that the existing tax system is burdensome, 
much of their justification for environmental charges is predicated upon the double-
7 
dividend and the economic value of the charges. The authors stated that: “Unlike 
command-and-control regulations, [environmental charges] provide market signals that 
allow firms and households to respond in innovative and efficient ways.” (p. 7). To 
support this argument the authors examined case studies of fees charged for municipal 
solid waste collection, tolls charged to reduce congestion, and carbon taxes (Repetto et al. 
1992). Similar arguments were shared by Hawkins (2013) in the 1990s who advocated 
for green fees and green taxes, although a clear functional decision between the two does 
not appear to have been made.1 However, Hawken (2013) notes that green taxes “[are] 
not to raise revenue for the government but to provide participants in the marketplace 
with accurate information about cost.” (p. 144) Much like green fees, this point is 
predicated upon Pigouvian concepts. However, the advocacy by Hawkins (2013) for a 
revenue neutral policy appears to preclude green fees as a means of recapturing the 
government’s cost in addressing an environmental externality. 
 Dower and Repetto (1994) built upon previous work by noting that the results 
from public opinion polls and focus groups suggested that the public generally preferred 
the use of economic incentives (e.g., environmental fees) to entice compliance with 
environmental goals of policymakers as opposed to command and control regulation 
(Dower & Repetto 1994). The authors ultimately concluded that “[the] lack of experience 
with pollution taxes creates a ‘chicken or the egg’ problem” (Dower & Repetto 1994, p. 
170), noting that existing fees and changes on waste and pollution had not been enough to 
entice policymakers to explore environmental taxes. In contrast, the earlier work by 
 
1
 Originally published in 1993, “The Ecology of Commerce” in fact cites Repetto et al. (1992) in the 
revised edition referred to in this report (Hawkins 2013). 
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Repetto et al. (1992), while still advocating for a revenue shift, portrayed environmental 
charges as policy instruments that could be used for used to collect general revenue (i.e., 
taxes) or recapture the government’s costs (i.e., fees). This distinction is even more 
germane when Repetto argued that taxing environmental resources, whose use generated 
negative externalities (e.g., pollution and waste), was more appropriate than taxing the 
earnings of labor and capital, which generated positive social and economic externalities 
(Repetto 1996). 
 Despite the advocacy for environmental charges in the 1990s, the early 2000s 
through the 2010s were defined, in part, by a shift to evaluating what had previously 
worked in environmental movements and regulations (Coglianese 2001; Markell 2010; 
Cranor 2017). In critically reviewing existing regulations, authors would argue that while 
the programs may have represented major advancements for environmental regulation in 
the United States, reform was needed to address shortcomings (Daley & Layton 2004). 
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was particularly targeted with calls for reform 
with authors noting that a mechanism for properly funding it was needed (Greenwood 
2009). These critical reviews were also accompanied by arguments in favor of new 
regulation to address such problems as electronic waste (Elisha 2010) and cigarette waste 
(Novotny et al. 2009). Additionally, the role of carbon dioxide in global climate change 
was increasingly a concern, leading the exploration of carbon taxes (Sumner et al. 2009; 
Lin & Li 2011; Metcalf 2019) and market-based policy approaches such as national cap 
and trade programs (Metcalf 2009; Astoria 2014).  
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Scholarship advocating for Pigouvian approaches to addressing environmental 
externalities was balanced by critical scholarship noting possible shortcoming inherent in 
how Pigouvian taxes are implemented (Fleischer 2015). Authors also frequently noted 
that public support for increased taxation could be quite tenuous (Agrawal 2010; 
Kallbekken & Sælen 2011; Duncan et al. 2020). Legal scholarship also noted that pricing 
environmental externalities was challenging under state laws given their diversity and 
possible resistance to the enactment of any new taxation (Scharff 2018). Furthermore, the 
idea of an inherent “double dividend” was challenged with economists noting that while 
environmental taxation usually leads to positive environmental impacts (i.e., 
environmental dividends) general economic benefits were not assured (Freire-González 
2018). Effectively, the 2010s concluded with continued interest in the use of Pigouvian 
approaches to address environmental externalities, but limited interest in green fees per 
se while other policy instruments received more interest. 
 
2.1 Environmental Charges, Taxes, or Fees? 
Table 1. Various environmental charges that may be applied, as defined by Repetto et al. 
(1992) 
Environmental Charges 
Taxes Fees 
Green Taxes / Environmental Taxes 
Carbon Taxes 
Fuel Taxes 
Green Fees 
Emissions Fees / Effluent Charges 
Impact Fees 
Subsidies or Rebates Deposit-Return Charges 
Electric Vehicle Rebate Bottle Deposits 
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The terms green fees, green taxes, environmental charges, and environmental taxes are 
commonly used in the context of environmental charges (see Repetto et al. 1992; 
Hoffmann & Boyd 2006; KPMG 2017; Williams 2016). However, the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD 2001) uses strict definitions for taxes, 
“any compulsory unrequited payment to general governments levied on tax-bases” (p. 
15), and fees or charges, “requited payments to government;  … levied more or less in 
proportion to services provided” (p. 15). In the context of their implementation in the 
United States, taxes at the federal level must be legislated by Congress and may be used 
to fund any governmental function (Repetto et al 1992; Spitzer 2002). In contrast, fees are 
largely intended to recover the government’s cost in providing goods or services (Spitzer 
2002; Scharff 2018). Fees typically also have a voluntariness to them in that an individual 
or business should be able to avoid the fee by not engaging in the relevant activity 
(Scharff 2018).  
 The implementation of environmental charges can be nuanced, and while several 
different environmental policy instruments can be classified as an environmental charge, 
taxes and fees are typically the primary focus. In their advocacy of environmental 
charges, Repetto et al (1992) developed the classification depicted in Table 1. In addition 
to taxes and fees, the authors included subsidies or rebates along with deposit-return 
charges.2 Environmental taxes (also referred to as green taxes), impose a tax that is 
 
2 To elaborate on the instruments. Subsides or rebates, may be offered to consumers or businesses to elicit 
more environmentally friendly purchases, such as plug-in electric vehicles, thus influencing consumer 
decision making (DeShazo et al. 2017). Deposit-return changes are programs in which a deposit is collected 
when a product is purchased (e.g., beverage containers) and the deposit is returned when the used product 
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intended to reduce the production of an environmental externality (e.g., carbon dioxide 
emissions) while at the same time generating revenue for the government (Williams 
2016). The first example of these, carbon taxes, impose a tax upon the combustion of 
carbon-based fuels (Ramseur & Leggett 2019). The second example, fuel taxes, differ 
from other taxes on fuel that intended to fund repairs and improvements to transportation 
networks (Agrawal et al. 2010), since they are designed to reduce fuel consumption 
resulting in environmental benefits (Kallbekken & Sælen 2011). Environmental fees (also 
referred to as green fees) are typically assessed in the context of a service being rendered, 
typically the emission of some form of pollution into the environment (Hoffmann & 
Boyd 2006). Intuitively named emissions fees are assessed on the discharge of pollutants 
into the environment (e.g., emissions from a smokestack), but may also include charges 
accessed on wastes deposited for treatment in public wastewater treatment works 
(Repetto et al. 1992). Finally, impact fees are assessed to offset the environment impacts 
associated with an activity (e.g., installation of a septic system) (Repetto et al. 1992).3 
Since the intent of this report is not intended as examination of the implementation 
details, the term environmental charges has been adopted to refer to taxes or fees that are 
intended to capture or recover the costs associated with the environmental externalities 
(e.g., clean-up or safe disposal of waste). 
 
 
is returned (e.g., empty beverage containers). While these programs have been credited with reducing 
littering (Moore & Scott 1983), their applicability is inherently limited to situations where there is a product 
that can be effectively returned. 
3
 The assessment of fees on tourists to mitigate the environmental impacts of their visits (see Lyte 2019) 
could be considered green fees or impact fees. Ultimately it would be the precise legal implementation and 
how the revenues collected were used that would determine the categorization 
12 
3. Examining Environmental Charges 
3.1 Approach 
While Fullerton (1996) classified environmental taxes based upon their inclusion in the 
Internal Revenue Services’ “Statistics of Income” this report takes a simpler two-point 
approach to selecting them: 
 
1. Is there specificity in how the tax is applied? 
2. Are the proceeds used in connection to the environment? 
 
Underlying both these questions is the presumption that an environmental tax has an 
obvious connection to the environment. For example, income taxes which are deposited 
in the General Fund may ultimately fund a wide range of environmentally positive 
actions (e.g., funding pollution clean-up via appropriations to the Environmental 
Protection Agency); however, it is intuitive that income taxes are constructed with the 
intent of funding a wide range of governmental operations and services. Thus, it is 
necessary to examine a tax for the specificity associated to determine what the connection 
to the environment may (or may not) be. The second question interrogates how the 
proceeds are being used in connection to the environment. This point is particularly 
germane to the considering “implicit” environmental taxes identified by Fullerton (1996) 
as well as expanding beyond their work to consider other programs. 
With these criteria in mind, possible environmental charges were collected based 
upon their classification as such in literature sources (see Fullerton 1996; KPMG 2017). 
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This accounted for the majority of policies barring the Nuclear Waste Fund Fee which 
was included due to the negative environmental impact that high-level radioactive waste 
can have upon the environment (Holt 2019). Government sources (i.e., government 
statutes or reports) where then used as the primary source to determine how the charges 
were applied and used. Upon completion of the examination policies were deemed an 
environmental charge if they met both criteria in full or part. This resulted in a total of 
fourteen polices were identified as possible environmental charges, of which six clearly 
satisfy both criteria.  
 
3.2 Examination 
In analysis performed by Fullerton (1996), Aviation Taxes and Fees and various charges 
related to the Highway Trust Fund where included as implicit environmental taxes. 
However, while they may have some nominal environmental effects, both appear to be 
intended to support transportation infrastructure. Aviation taxes and fees, predominately 
on passenger tickets and aviation fuel, are used to fund the Airport and Airway Trust 
Fund which in turn is used for operations and maintenance as well as funding the Federal 
Aviation Administration (Tang & Elias 2017).4 Similarly, federal taxes on gasoline and 
diesel fund the Highway Trust Fund which in turn is used to finance infrastructure and 
public transportation programs (Kirk & Mallett 2020; Lowry 2016).5 The Inland 
Waterways Trust Fund has a similar implicit environmental connection leading it its 
 
4 For fiscal year 2016 80% of operations and maintenance, and 88% of the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s budget were from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund with the remainder being remitted 
from the General Fund (Tang & Elias 2017). 
5 Truck registration fees as well as taxes on truck tires also contribute (Kirk & Mallett 2020). 
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identification as a green tax (KPMG 2017); however, closer examination shows that it 
may be considered a transportation tax with nominal environmental connections. The 
trust fund is financed by a fuel tax on commercial barge fuel, which in turn is used for 
operations and maintenance expenditures connected to inland waterways (Stern 2014).6  
 While some of the polices considered where predominately focused supporting 
transportation infrastructure, the Gas Guzzler Tax and the tax on Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals appear to be Pigouvian in their applications. The Gas Guzzler Tax originated 
with the Energy Tax Act of 1978 targets certain passenger vehicles whose fuel economy 
is under 22.5 miles per gallon (Guenther 2006).7 Passenger vehicles under the fuel 
economy requirements are then subjected to an increasing tax based their measured fuel 
economy (Office of Transportation and Air Quality 2012). As noted in the Congressional 
Research Service report by Guenther (2006) this has the effect of servicing two policy 
goals: promoting the development of fuel-efficient vehicles and “[mitigating] the 
negative external effects of driving relatively fuel-inefficient cars” (p. 11). Both of these 
goals compare favorability to Pigouvian taxes intended to alter marketplace behaviors 
though goal setting and appropriate taxation (Baumol 1972). 
 The second policy that may be considered a Pigouvian tax is the tax on ozone-
depleting chemicals, which was implemented with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 (P.L. 101-549) to implement the Montreal Protocol phase-out of ozone-depleting 
chemicals (Shouse & Lattanzio 2020). The tax was codified as part of 26 CFR § 52, 
 
6 The tax was set at $0.20 per gallon as of 2014 (Stern 2014). 
7 Passenger vehicles exclusive of eemergency vehicles, light trucks, and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) are 
not subject to the tax (Guenther 2006).  
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Environmental Taxes, and imposes a tax on the sale (26 CFR § 52.4682-2) and floor 
stocks (26 CFR § 52.4682-4) of ozone-depleting chemicals, exclusive of a limited 
number of permissible uses. The amount of tax is then determined based upon the base 
tax rate for the year of sale or use of along with the ozone depletion factor as a multiplier 
(IRS 2007). While Fullerton (1996) argues that the tax may be considered a windfall 
profits tax, the annual increase in tax rates coupled with production cuts by manufactures 
in response to the cut suggest that Pigouvian concepts at play.  
 The remaining policy that does not fit the criteria for an environmental charge is 
the Corporate Environmental Income Tax (CEIT) that was created by the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Bearden 2012). Upon its creation, the 
CEIT was set at 0.12% of the alternative minimum taxable income in excess of $2 
million and payable even if the standard alternative minimum tax was not applicable 
(Bearden 2012). While this limited the number of companies that were responsible for 
paying the CEIT, the revenues were enough to account for approximately 28.4% of 
Superfund revenues through the fiscal years 1991 to 1995 (Brazell & Gerardi 1994; 
Ramseur et al. 2008).8 However, the CEIT was controversial while it was active, and 
opinions were, and remain, split upon its fairness and impact upon businesses (see 
Brazell & Gerardi 1994; Felsenthal 1996; Ramseur et al. 2008; Bearden 2012). While the 
unpopularity of the CEIT may have contributed to the expiration of the taxing authority, 
Ramseur et al. (2008) note that Republican leadership during the 104th and 106th 
 
8
 Superfund revenues for FY1991 to FY1995 were: petroleum tax $2,800 million (25.4%), chemical 
feedstocks and derivatives $1,327 million (12.1%), CEIT $3,121 million (28.4%), cost recoveries from 
potentially responsible parties $901 million (8.2%), fines and penalties $11 million (0.1%), interest $1,003 
million (9.1%), and general fund revenues $1,845 million (16.8%) (Ramseur et al. 2008, p. 2). 
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Congresses were opposed to renewal unless the liability provisions; which governed the 
identification of potentially responsible parties; of the CERCLA were “removed or 
modified” (p. 3). As such, while the lack of specificity of the CEIT precludes the CEIT as 
an environmental charge, it may also act as a litmus test for how far the “polluter pays” 
principle can be extended. 
 The next two policies, the Aquatic Resources Trust Fund and Wildlife Restoration 
Trust Fund, offer a transition between polices that do not meet the criteria for an 
environmental charge and those that do since both contain provisions that partially meet 
the requirements for an environmental charge. The Aquatic Resources Trust Fund 
consists of two accounts, a Sport Fish Restoration Account which is used for 
environmentally connected programs, and the Boating Trust Fund which is used for 
safety programs (Upton & Corn 2012). The trust fund is supported by fuel taxes 
attributed to motorboat fuel subject to the Highway Trust Fund, annual excise taxes on 
sport fishing equipment, and import duties on fishing tackle, yachts, and pleasure craft 
(Upton & Corn 2012). While the specificity test is fulfilled for sport fishing equipment, 
the connection becomes more tenuous with fuel taxes that are remitted to, then drawn 
from, the Highway Trust Fund. Likewise, the dual nature of the trust fund in supporting 
multiple actives dilutes the clear environmental connection.9  
 Originally enacted through the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act in 1937, 
also referred to as the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, the Wildlife 
Restoration Trust Fund supports multiple purposes with clear environmental connections 
 
9 Other activities include coastal wetlands restoration, sewage disposal, docking facility maintenance, and 
other conservation activities (Upton & Corn 2012). 
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(Crafton 2019). Funding for the trust fund is provided by taxes on firearms, ammunition, 
and archery equipment, with no distinction being on if the equipment is likely to be used 
for hunting (Crafton et al. 2018; Crafton 2019).10 While there is a clear degree of 
specificity in terms of what the tax is collected on (in contrast to the CEIT), the lack of 
distinction on equipment intended for hunting versus recreational shooting suggests only 
a partial environment connection at the time of collection. Following the deposit of 
proceeds in the trust fund they are then allocated for administrative expenses, hunter 
safety and education, multistate conservation grants, and wildlife restoration (Crafton 
2019). While wildlife restoration and conservation grants support a clear environmental 
connection, the hunter safety and education programs indicate that the policy is fulfilling 
multiple roles. Accordantly, while aspects of the policy are suggestive of an 
environmental charge, the program as whole is multipurpose.  
 While the Aquatic Resources Trust Fund and Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund 
occupy liminal positions as environmental charges, the remaining six clearly meet the 
requirements. The first two of these, the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund 
and Oil Spill Liability program are similar in their targeted function. In addition to other 
taxes collected as part of the Highway Trust Fund, a nominal collection is allocated to the 
Leaking Underground Storage Tank trust fund for use by the Environmental Protection 
Agency for the prevention, detection, and clean-up of leaks from underground petroleum 
storage tanks (Lowry 2016).11 The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund provides an immediate 
 
10 The rates are set at 10% on pistols and revolvers; 11% on all other firearms; 11% on ammunition 
inclusive of shells and cartridges; and 11% on bows, attachable bow accessors, quivers, broadheads, points, 
and arrow shafts (Crafton 2019). 
11 Currently set at one mill ($0.001) per gallon of fuel sold (Lowry 2016). 
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reserve of funds for clean-up and recovery efforts following oil (Ramseur 2017). While 
the trust fund has had a chaotic history since its creation in 1986, being sunset and 
reauthorized repeatedly, it is intended to be funded via a per barrel tax on crude oil 
(Ramseur 2019).12 
 Next the Coal Excise Tax, Superfund Excise Taxes, Nuclear Waste Fund Fee, and 
TSCA administrative fees will be examined in greater depth. These environmental 
charges were selected for closer examination for a variety of reasons specific to each 
reason. First, while the Coal Excise Tax was noted by Fullerton (1996), only a cursory 
exemption was offered and the focus on human heath warrants closer examination. In 
contrast, Fullerton (1996) offered a close examination of Superfund Excise Taxes, but the 
expiration of the excise taxes since the work of Fullerton suggests that an update is 
warranted. Finally, the remaining two policies, the Nuclear Waste Fund Fee and TSCA 
administrative fee were not examined by Fullerton (1996). 
 
3.2.1 Coal Excise Tax 
One of the earliest programs with parallels to an environmental charge at the federal level 
is the Coal Excise Tax, which funds the Black Lung Program and Black Lung Disability 
Trust Fund. The federal Black Lung Program’s origin lies in Title IV of the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, and subsequent amendments such as the Black 
 
12 Set at $0.09 per barrel as of 2019 (Ramseur 2019). 
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Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (Prunty & Solomons 1989).13 As part of the Black Lung 
Benefits Act, Congress found that, “…that there are a significant number of coal miners 
living today who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in 
one or more of the Nation’s coal mines;” (30 U.S. Code § 901).  This effectively 
established a connection between employment and the pneumoconiosis, also referred to 
as coal workers’ pneumoconiosis or black lung, which is an inflammation of the lungs 
commonly associated with occupational exposure to silica or coal dust (Prunty & 
Solomons 1989; Szymendera & Sherlock 2019).14 The Black Lung Benefits Act then 
proceeded to establish the intent was to provide adequate compensation due to total 
disability or death arising from pneumoconiosis. While early versions of the Black Lung 
Benefits Acts placed the onus of administration and financing upon the Social Security 
Administration, this proved untenable due to limited testing and the required burden of 
proof (Prunty & Solomons 1989). To address the growing concerns and alleviate the 
burden on the Social Security Administration, the burden was shifted to coal mine 
operators with the establishment of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund through the 
Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 (Kerr 1980; Szymendera & Sherlock 2019). 
The Coal Excise Tax is an excise tax on each ton of surface or subsurface coal 
that is mined for sale or use in the United States, exclusive of lignite and revenues are 
 
13
 Further amendments to the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 include the Black Lung Benefits Reform 
Act of 1977, Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, and Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981. 
(Lopatto 1983; Prunty and Solomons 1989) 
14
 Formally pneumoconiosis is defined by the Black Lung Benefits Act as “any chronic lung disease or 
impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment. This definition includes, but is not 
limited to, any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment.” 
20 C.F.R. §718.201(a)(2) 
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deposited in the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Lopatto 1983; Szymendera & 
Sherlock 2019).15, 16 Miners that are affected by pneumoconiosis, were initially eligible 
for benefits upon quitting work and a determination they were totally disabled due to 
their exposure to coal dust, although these provisions were later relaxed (Kerr 1980; 
Szymendera & Sherlock 2019). Upon determination of eligibility, affected miners are 
eligible for medical and disability benefits starting at a rate equivalent to 37.5% of the 
basic pay for a federal GS-2, Step 1 employee without locality adjustment (Szymendera 
& Sherlock 2019).17 Under the provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act, coal mine 
operators are responsible for the payment of benefits due to disability or death arising 
from pneumoconiosis and must carry insurance or self-insurance sufficient to cover 
claims in addition to payment of the Coal Excise Tax. Funds collected through the excise 
tax are deposited in the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and used to pay benefits when 
responsible mine operators are unable to pay benefits due to bankruptcy or lack of a 
successor operator (Szymendera & Sherlock 2019).  
The Coal Excise Tax demonstrates clear specificity with the tax being limited to 
mined coal. Furthermore, the use of proceeds is clearly directed at a negative 
environmental externality (i.e., coal dust impacting miner’s health) and recovery of the 
government’s burden in managing the externality (i.e., the Coal Excise Tax funding the 
Black Lung Program and Black Lung Disability Trust Fund). While the provisions of the 
 
15
 Lignite, also referred to as brown coal, is the lowest grade of coal that is mined. 
16
 As of January 1, 2020, the rates per ton of coal are the lower of $0.55 for surface, $1.10 for subsurface, 
or 4.4% of sales price (Internal Revenue Service 2020, p. 32) 
17
 $660.10 per month as of calendar year 2019, this figure would increase based upon the number of 
dependents the claimant has (Szymendera and Sherlock 2019). 
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Black Lung Benefits Act calls for coal mine operators to act as the responsible parties 
and carry insurance to cover damages due to disability or death in miners, in practice the 
government carries a significant ongoing burden in paying benefits due to current and 
potential bankruptcies by mine operators (Szymendera & Sherlock 2019). Despite the 
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act and subsequent amendments being intended to 
improve the health and safety of miners (Kerr 1980); coal miners continue to file for 
benefits and claimants with severe pneumoconiosis (progressive massive fibrosis) has 
been on the rise since the early 1990s (Almberg et al. 2018).  
 
3.2.2 Superfund Excise Taxes 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) of 1980 extensively applied the polluter pays principle in its construction and 
who pays for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites (Daley & Layton 2004; Bearden 
2012). However, despite the goal of CERCLA being the recovery of clean-up costs from 
potentially responsible parties, CERCLA included provisions for the creation of the 
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (the Superfund) to finance clean-up when 
potentially responsible parties could not be found, or an immediate response was 
warranted (Brazell & Gerardi 1994). Initial funding of the Superfund was a combination 
of appropriations from the General Fund along with dedicated excise taxes on petroleum 
and chemical feedstocks (Bearden 2012). The funding was later expanded by the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 to include an excise tax on 
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chemical derivatives and the creation of the Corporate Environmental Income Tax 
(CEIT) (Bearden 2012).18  
 Excise taxes, along with the CEIT, would be a major source of income for the 
Superfund until 1995 when the taxing authority lapsed (Bearden 2012). Since the lapse, 
appropriations from the General Fund have been a major source of revenue for the 
Superfund, although generally insufficient to support the full scope of the program 
(Government Accountability Office 2015).    
While it is clear that CERCLA and its amendments are built upon the application 
of the polluter pays principle, the excise taxes created by the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act deviate from the Pigouvian expectations for an environmental 
charge, namely the change is sufficient to encourage reductions in environmental 
externalities. In the case of the excise taxes, the impact on businesses purchasing 
petroleum as a raw material would have been minor. In the first fiscal year of the 
Superfund excise taxes the per barrel tax on petroleum was $0.0079 while the cost per 
barrel crude was $33.67 to $36.67 (Barnhardt 1982; Braginskii 2009).19 This is 
approximately 0.022% to 0.023% of the cost per barrel being the tax, strongly implying 
that the intent of the tax was not to discourage the utilization of petroleum as a raw 
material but rather the stated goal of funding the Superfund. This targeted nature of the 
excise tax allows for the specificity aspect of an environmental charge to be fulfilled. 
While it fell upon other policy instruments present in the CERCLA to attempt to address 
 
18
 Prior to their expiration at the end of 1995, these excise taxes amounted to $0.097 per barrel of 
petroleum, and variable rates on chemicals ranging from $0.22 to $4.87 per ton (Bearden 2012). 
19
 The tax is specifically for the quarters ending June 30, 1981 to March 31, 1982 while the nominal cost 
per barrel reflects the average world cost for the entire calendar year. 
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the environmental externalities produced through abandoned or improperly disposed of 
waste, the proceeds from the excise tax were used remitted to the Superfund and intended 
for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites (Bearden 2012). This satisfies the second test 
for an environmental charge by establishing that the proceeds were used in connection to 
the environment. 
 
3.2.3 Nuclear Waste Fund Fee 
The long-term disposal of high-level radioactive waste, such spent fuel rods from civilian 
nuclear power plants, remains a problem in the United States (Holt 2018). Under the 
provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, high-level radioactive 
waste was to be disposed of in a geological repository, such as the facility proposed for 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Solomon 2009). In support of such a facility, the NWPA 
established the Nuclear Waste Fund and established a fee of one mill ($0.001) per-
kilowatt hour of electricity generated and sold by nuclear power plants starting in 1983 
(42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(3)).20 While the fee was intended to be collected in perpetuity, the 
inability for a geological repository to be constructed has resulted in the fee being 
suspended due to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) inability to take possession of high-
level radioactive waste. 
 When the NWPA was passed in 1982, Yucca Mountain was leading consideration 
as a possible geological repository and amendments to the NWPA in 1987 resulted in a 
Congressional mandate that Yucca Mountain was the sole site of interest (Solomon 
 
20
 Before the fee was terminated in 2013, proceeds were estimated at $750 million per year (Holt 2018). 
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2009). However, Yucca Mountain would not become the de facto site until formal 
recognition in 2002 (Solomon 2009). While the residents and government of Nevada 
were generally against the development of the site starting in the 1980s, it would not be 
until after the submission of a license application by the DOE in 2008 that legal protests 
were sufficient for the Obama Administration (2009 - 2017) to terminate consideration of 
the site (Werner 2012; Holt 2018).21 The termination in turn resulted in court challenges 
that led to the termination of the fee by the courts in 2013, who cited the DOE’s inability 
to conduct a reasonable fee assessment due to lack of information on where the waste 
would go  (National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions v. United States 
Department of Energy 2013).22 Since the termination, nuclear power plant operators have 
sued the DOE to recover storage costs with payments totaling $7.4 billion as of 2019 
(Holt 2019). The payments of $7.4 billion to nuclear plant operators for storage costs can 
be contextualized against the $28.2 billion balance of the fund as of August 2012, the 
result of collections from 1983 to 2009 and accrued interest on the balance (DOE 2013). 
While a sizable position of the fund’s balance, storage of high-level radioactive waste 
does not imply disposal and a long-term solution is still needed as the nuclear plant 
operators remain the custodians of the waste (Holt 2019).  Thus, while the loss of the fee 
has not necessary been detrimental to the health of the fund, there is also lack of clarity as 
 
21
 Following termination of Yucca Mountain for consideration as a geological repository, the Obama 
Administration established a Blue Ribbon Commission to evaluate how high-level radioactive waste may 
be handled in the future. As part of their report, the commission declined to comment upon the 
appropriateness of Yucca Mountain as a geological repository citing the fact that the commission was not 
charged with evaluating sites (Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future 2012). 
22
 While terminated by the Obama Administration, the Trump Administration (2017 - present) has 
attempted to restart the process of considering Yucca Mountain (Holt 2018). 
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to what the fund can be used for giving the statutory requirements that the fund be used 
solely for the disposal of, and activity related to, the disposal of radioactive waste (42 
U.S.C. § 10222(d)).23 
 Had the development of Yucca Mountain proceeded as intended by policymakers 
in designing the Nuclear Waste Fund and associated fee, the program would be an ideal 
example of an environmental charge as well as an exemplar of the acceptance of an 
environmental externality. While previous adequacy reports filed by the DOE raised the 
possibility that the fund may not be enough to cover costs, the provisions of the NWPA 
allowed the fee to be adjusted as needed (Holt 2018). Accordingly, this supports the 
premise that the Nuclear Waste Fund fee was intended to fully capture the government’s 
burden in managing high-level nuclear waste. Given that high-level nuclear waste is 
effectively a durable threat to health and the environment, it is unclear if long-term 
disposal can be managed by the private sector (see Solomon 2009; Werner 2012; Holt 
2018).24 This precludes any argument that the Nuclear Waste Fund Fee may have been a 
Pigouvian tax since high-level radioactive waste is an expected by-product of uranium 
oxide-based nuclear power plants (Werner 2012). On the contrary, Pigouvian concepts 
would support the elimination of civilian nuclear power plants given that they produce 
the waste.  
 
 
23
 The Nuclear Waste Fund balance was approximately $37.2 billion at the end of FY2019, yielding 
approximately $1.5 billion in interest (Holt 2018). 
24
 As noted by Pasqualetti (1997) disposal sites are presumed to be hazardous up to 10,000 years in the 
future or longer.  
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3.2.4 Toxic Substances Control Act Administration Fees 
As part of a broader policy agenda in regulating chemical substances and mixtures in 
U.S. commerce, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976 directed the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to ensure that chemical manufacturers and 
processors conduct testing of chemical substances to determine the potential for harm to 
humans and the environment (Schierow 2009). In addition to the ability to change 
manufactures with testing, the EPA was authorized to collect and inventory information 
on chemicals and their usage in commerce (Schierow 2009). However, in practice the 
EPA struggled with compelling the necessary testing, leading to limited safety 
information on new products or those grandfathered under the TSCA (Cranor 2017). 
While the TSCA was viewed as “cutting edge environmental law” (Greenwood 2009, p. 
10034) at the time of its enactment, this view diminished over time with the TSCA 
increasingly viewed as a “broken” (p. 10034) statute (see also Abelkop & Graham 2015; 
Cranor 2017). As part of their critiques of the TSCA, scholars have noted that the EPA’s 
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, the implementer of the TSCA program, is 
“one of the most underfunded programs in all of [the] EPA.” (Greenwood 2009, p. 
10036). Indeed, Greenwood (2009) goes as far as to argue that the fiscal struggles of the 
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics have resulted in the EPA being unable to enact 
and enforce the TSCA as originally envisioned.  
 The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (Lautenberg 
Chemical Safety Act), passed in 2016, was intended to address the shortcomings of the 
TSCA and addresses the fiscal burden of the TSCA’s administration by improving the 
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ability of the EPA to use and assess fees for services rendered (Schmidt 2016). While the 
original provisions of the TSCA allowed for fees to be assessed by the EPA, the fees 
were capped and collected funds remitted to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury (EPA 
2018b).25 However, the provisions of the Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act allow for the 
promulgation of TSCA administrative fees to be charged to user and sufficient to cover 
25% of the EPA’s costs in administering the TSCA provisions concerning the oversight 
of testing, risk assessment, and chemical inventories maintained by the EPA (Bergeson 
2018; EPA 2018b). The TSCA administrative fees can then be adjusted every three years 
as needed to account for inflation and budgetary changes (Bergeson 2018). Following 
promulgation of the rule making the fees went into place October 2018 and are now 
being collected (EPA 2018a).  
 The promulgation of the administrative fees also ensures that they meet the 
criteria for an environmental charge. The assessment of the fees is limited to chemical 
manufactures or importers that are subject to the reporting provisions of the TSCA (EPA 
2018a). The collection of these fees is then used to “… defray a portion of the costs of 
administering TSCA sections 4, 5, and 6 and collecting, processing, reviewing, providing 
access to, and protecting information about chemical substances from disclosure as 
appropriate under TSCA section 14.” (EPA 2018a, p. 52694).26 These operations are the 
purview of the Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics which indicates that the fees 
 
25 The maxim fees were capped with small business being assessed up to $100 while other entities could be 
changed up to $2,500 yielding approximately $1.1 million in annual revenue (EPA 2018b) 
26 TSCA section 4 governs chemical testing and reporting, section 5 governs review of new chemicals, 
section 6 governs import and export requirements, and section 14 concerns confidential business 
information (Schierow 2009). 
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will be used in a limited fashion for activities that are connected to the environment, 
namely the regulation of chemicals that have the potential to damage human health or the 
environment. 
 
3.3 Policy Summary 
Table 2. Policies considered versus criteria for an environmental charge. The 
“Specificity” and “Use of Proceeds” columns correspond to the two criteria for an 
environmental charge while the “Active” column indicates if the policy is still active as 
of the calendar year 2020. 
 Specificity? Use of Proceeds? Active 
Aviation Taxes 
and Fees 
Yes, on air 
transportation ticket 
sales as well as 
aviation fuel. 
No, funds are deposited in 
the Airport and Airway Trust 
Fund which has only 
nominal environmental 
connections. 
Yes 
Aquatic Resources 
Trust Fund 
Partial, proceeds 
come from a 
collection of excise 
taxes that include fuel, 
sport fishing 
equipment. 
Partial, the trust fund has 
two accounts, one of which 
is allocated towards sport 
fish restoration. 
Yes 
Coal Excise Tax Yes, assessed on 
mined goal for sale or 
use. 
Yes, funds benefits for coal 
miners affected by 
pneumoconiosis not cared 
for by responsible parties. 
Yes 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Income Tax 
No, broadly assessed 
in corporate income. 
Yes, funds are deposited in 
the Superfund.  
No 
Gas Guzzler Tax Yes, vehicles that do 
not meet fuel economy 
standards.  
No, funds are remitted to the 
General Fund. 
Yes 
Highway Trust 
Fund 
Yes, largely financed 
by taxes on 
transportation fuels. 
No, funds are primarily 
intended for the repair 
maintenance, and 
construction of roads. 
Yes 
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 Specificity? Use of Proceeds? Active 
Inland Waterways 
Trust Fund 
Yes, limited to diesel 
fuel intended for use 
on commercial 
waterways. 
No, funds are primarily 
intended for repair and 
maintenance, although some 
may be used to rehabilitate 
inland waterways.  
Yes 
Leaking 
Underground 
Storage Tank 
Trust Fund 
Yes, tax is assessed on 
gasoline. 
Yes, funds are deposited in 
the trust fund and used for 
the clean-up of leaking 
underground storage tanks. 
Yes 
Nuclear Waste 
Fund Fee 
Yes, assessed on per 
kilowatt basis for 
power generated in 
civilian nuclear power 
plants. 
Yes, long-term disposal of 
high-level radioactive waste. 
No 
Oil Spill Liability Yes, assessed on 
barres of petroleum 
sold. 
Yes, funds prevention, 
detection, and clean-up of 
leaking underground 
petroleum storage tanks. 
Yes27 
Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals 
Yes, assessed on 
chemicals based upon 
their physical 
characteristics. 
No, funds are deposited in 
the general fund. 
Yes 
Superfund Excise 
Taxes 
Yes, assessed on 
petroleum and 
chemical feedstocks. 
Yes, clean-up of hazardous 
waste sites. 
No 
Toxic Substances 
Control Act 
(TSCA) 
Administration 
Fees 
Yes, limited to 
chemical 
manufactures and 
importers subject to 
TSCA provisions.  
Yes, funds the operations of 
Office of Pollution 
Prevention and Toxics 
Yes 
Wildlife 
Restoration Trust 
Fund 
Partial, limited to 
firearms, ammunition, 
and archery 
equipment. 
Partial, funds primarily used 
for wildlife restoration 
programs but also support 
hunter safety programs. 
Yes 
 
Before evaluating the environmental charge found, it is appropriate to first summarize 
which were identified as such. Table 2 surmises all of the polices that were examined and 
 
27 Set to expire on December 31, 2020 (P.L 116-94 § 134) 
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indicates if they pass the tests for an environmental charge. The “Active” column in 
Table 2 is also provided since some of the policies are no longer in effect (e.g., Superfund 
Excise Taxes) or may soon expire. Review of the polices showed that all, barring the 
CEIT, were limited as to what was taxed. In the case of the Aquatic Resources and 
Wildlife Restoration Trust Funds the broader scope of the tax assessments precluded 
them being considered specific, but they were not as broad as the CEIT. For the second 
part of the test (i.e., are the proceeds used in connection to the environment) all except for 
the tax on ozone depleting chemicals used some form of use of earmarks and trust funds 
to limit how the proceeds were used. Accordingly, determining the environmental 
connection became the primary litmus test for the environmental charges. While some of 
the policies reviewed have a nominal environmental connection (e.g., Inland Waterways 
Trust Fund), polices were deemed to pass when there was a clear environmental 
externality being addressed (e.g., cleaning up hazardous waste).  
 
3.4 Analysis 
Table 3. Identified environmental charges, the externality they address, and the nature of 
their cost recovery. 
 Externality Cost Recovery? 
Aquatic Resources 
Trust Fund 
Damage to aquatic 
ecosystems 
Partial, funds allocated to sport fish 
restoration are used for environmental 
restoration activities. 
Coal Excise Tax Damage to human 
health 
Partial and Preemptive, mine operators 
must carry insurance to respond to miner 
claims, but the government will intervene 
with a responsible party cannot be found. 
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 Externality Cost Recovery? 
Leaking 
Underground 
Storage Tank Trust 
Fund  
Ground pollution Partial and Preemptive, funds are used 
for prevention, detection, and clean-up of 
leaks. 
Nuclear Waste 
Fund Fee 
High-level 
radioactive waste 
Complete, statute allows for fees to be 
adjusted to ensure that the fund covers the 
costs of high-level radioactive waste 
disposal. 
Oil Spill Liability Ground and/or 
water pollution 
Preemptive, trust fund is used to respond 
to spill, but responsible party is targeted 
for cost recovery.  
Superfund Excise 
Taxes 
Polluted sites Partial and Preemptive, significant 
contributions were made to the Superfund 
for clean-up operations. 
Toxic Substances 
Control Act 
Administrative 
Fees 
Potential impact to 
the environment 
and human health  
Preemptive, amount collected is limited 
to a fixed percentage of the costs 
associated with running Office of 
Pollution Prevention and Toxics. 
Wildlife 
Restoration Trust 
Fund 
Damage to 
ecosystems 
 
Partial, funds allocated to wildlife 
restoration programs are used for 
environmental restoration activities. 
 
This report postulates that the while environmental charges are typically based upon 
Pigouvian concepts, at the federal level in the United States, they are typically used to 
recover the government’s costs in addressing an environmental externality, a sentiment 
shared by Fullerton (1996). Based upon a review of potentially qualifying policies (see 
Section 3.1), eight policies were identified that meet the criteria for an environmental 
charge (see Table 3). In order to fully examine the claim, it must be established that an 
environmental eternality is addressed along with the nature of the cost recovery. 
 As demonstrated in Table 3, all of the environmental charges, except for the 
TSCA administrative fees, address a clear environmental externality. In the case of the 
Aquatic Resources Trust Fund and Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund the environmental 
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externality is quite broad; however, others are narrowly focused on specific 
environmental externalities. The Coal Excise Tax deviates from the concept of an 
environment exclusive of humans; however, it is not unreasonable to consider humans 
part of the environment, partially if an anthropocentric lens is applied (Kopnina et al. 
2018; Brennan & Low 2020). The environmental externality addressed by the TSCA 
administrative fees is preventative in nature since the provisions of the TSCA should be 
sufficient to prevent manufacture of a damaging chemical (Schierow 2009). As such the 
TSCA administrative fees is similar to the Aquatic Resource or Wildlife Restoration 
Trust Funds by addressing broad environmental externalities. Accordingly, all of the 
environmental charges outlined in Table 3 address an environmental externality, 
satisfying the first half of the claim. 
 The second half to the claim concerns the usage of the funds raised by an 
environmental charge, namely as cost recovery. Table 3 outlines the nature of the cost 
recovery by the environmental charges and several patterns are obvious. First, the 
majority of the environmental charges have partial cost recovery, since the fund received 
are insufficient to cover the complete costs. In contrast, the Nuclear Waste Fund Fee is 
intended to be a complete cost recovery since the DOE may adjust the fee as needed 
(DOE 2013). A number of the environmental charges are also considered preemptive 
since the funds are being collected before an event actually occurs. Furthermore, while 
Oil Spill Liability program and CERCLA both direct that costs be recovered from 
responsibly parities (Ramseur 2017; Bearden 2012), recovery is not assured. This 
supports the concept that the federal government is concerned with cost recovery since 
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the trust funds may be viewed as a form of insurance against future events. In contrast, 
trust funds where the proceeds are used to fund restoration activities are intuitively linked 
to cost recovery.  
 Except for the TSCA administrative fees, the polices deposit the funds received 
into trust funds that have significant restrictions upon their use. While the partial nature 
of the Aquatic Resources and Wildlife Restoration Trust Funds as environmental charges 
accounts for funds to be used for alternative purposes (e.g., boating and hunter safety 
programs, respectively), a connection to environmental restoration remains for the 
remainder. This statutory restriction on how the funds may be used further supports the 
claim that cost recovery is the intent. Finally, while the TSCA administrative fees 
collected are not deposited into a trust fund, they are earmarked for use by the Office of 
Pollution Prevention and Toxics (EPA 2018a). 
Collectively, the presence of a clear externality and evidence to support cost 
recovery supports the claim that the federal government uses environmental charges to 
recover the government’s costs in addressing an environmental externality. Furthermore, 
federal applications of environmental charges also contrast significantly with how 
environmental taxes have been applied from a Pigouvian perspective. For example, with 
carbon taxes there are clear attempts to inform the policy with Pigouvian concepts and 
effect behavioral change in the marketplace (Fleischer 2015). This leads to complications 
as taxes are set at rates high enough that it is necessary to ensure they do not become 
regressive (see Sumner et al. 2009; Fleischer 2015; Ramseur & Leggett 2019). In 
contrast, the federal policies examined typically have low fees that do not suggest an 
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intent to be punitive, as would be necessary to act as a Pigouvian tax.28 Indeed, the 
Pigouvian structure of the taxes on ozone depleting chemicals and the Gas Guzzler Tax 
suggest that policy makers are aware of Pigouvian concepts and have applied them with 
the intent of reducing an environmental externality.29 This suggests that while 
policymakers may be concerned about an environmental externality in the construction of 
an environmental charge, prevention or reduction of the externality is not the intent. This 
offers further, indirect, support for the claim that the focus is on cost recovery. 
One aspect of this analysis that is worth contrasting with the claim of Fullerton 
(1996) is that environmental charges do not necessarily need to be concerned with 
pollution per se. While pollution clean-up or prevention is a common theme, the presence 
of policies such as the Coal Excise Tax (i.e., human health) or Wildlife Restoration Trust 
Fund (e.g., damage to ecosystems due to hunting) suggests that policymakers take a 
broader view of environmental externalities that just pollution. 
 
4. Policy Implications 
4.1 Limitations 
Environmental charges, as narrowly defined by this report (see Section 3.1), appear to be 
effective in situations where they can be narrowly applied without concern for managing 
 
28
 While not closely examined by this report, low rates may actually be by design, as suggested by the 
TSCA administrative fees bore by individual users. Under the terms of the act, the Environmental 
Protection Agency is limited to collecting fees that defray 25% or 50% of the costs depending upon the 
specific activity (Environmental Protection Agency 2018). 
29 Authors such as Fullerton (1996) may debate this point since they noted the tax on ozone depleting 
chemicals was intended to be a windfall tax on profits resulting from the ban of ozone depleting chemicals. 
However, given that the marketplace reacted to the tax in accordance with Pigouvian theory (i.e., reducing 
production (Fullerton 1996)) this may be a philosophical point. 
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environmental externalities. The existence of a clear good or service upon which charges 
can be assisted and the government is required to intervene to mitigate the externalities 
may also assist in applying them. Examples such as the Coal Excise Tax and Nuclear 
Waste Fund Fee clearly demonstrate this since these programs have clear points of 
collection for fees (i.e., sale of coal and generation of power from nuclear fuel, 
respectively) and government intervention is required to manage externalities (i.e., 
disability due to pneumoconiosis and construction of geologic repositories, respectively). 
These programs also exhibit a clear connection between the what that the fee is being 
assessed upon and the necessity for government intervention. While not necessarily 
advantageous to these programs, this may also allow for more public acceptance for 
change given it goes to a clear purpose (Kallbekken & Sælen 201), although the extent of 
this effect may be quite limited (Duncan et al. 2020). However, the narrow scope in 
which green fees are appropriate may be a limitation, although it is not the only limitation 
to green fees as a policy instrument.  
One potential risk associated with the use of environmental charges is that 
increased costs of production might be mitigated by shifting the burden to markets with 
lower associated costs, the “race to the bottom” effect (Wheeler 2001) leading to the 
development of “pollution havens” where heavily polluting industries are subjected to 
lower regulations (De Melo & Grether 2004). This could be mitigated by having the 
application of environmental charges be applied to goods regardless of their country of 
origin. Thus, goods produced internationally and imported would be subjected to the 
same associated fees as those produced domestically. While this does not mitigate the 
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possibility of manufacturers relocating for lower wages, it does ensure that relocation to 
avoid associated fees is avoided.  
 A major risk in developing environmental charges is their potential to become a 
regressive tax. This is a common critique of carbon taxes, particularly when they are 
broadly applied to all fuels (Sumner et al. 2009; Fleischer 2015; Ramseur & Leggett 
2019). Santos and Catchesides (2005) argue that the effects of the increases to the United 
Kingdom’s Fuel Price Escalator, which increased the duty that was applied to fuel sales 
in the United Kingdom, were unequal in their distribution. The authors note when all 
households were examined, the gasoline costs as a portion of the total budget appears low 
for low-income households. However, when the costs are isolated to car-owning 
households, the lowest-income households may allocate 18% of their income to fuel 
compared to the richest which may only allocate 2%. Building upon this argument the 
authors modeled the possible effects of higher fuel duty rates and found that cost-of-
living increases were disproportionately borne by the poorest car-owning households as 
well as rural households. Despite this, fuel taxation remains frequently associated with 
environmental charges (see Agrawal et al 2010; Kallbekken & Sælen 2011). While the 
incorporation of taxes or fees on transportation fuels may be warranted as part of a 
broader framework, care is needed to avoid disproportionate impacts to lower income 
households.  
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4.2 Possible Applications 
One of the challenges that policymakers face is determining how to ensure adequate 
funding to support their goals and objectives, particularly when remediating 
environmental externalities where cost recovery may be extremely limited (e.g., 
abandoned waste sites) or when managing non-point pollution sources (e.g., air pollution 
or litter). Environmental charges offer a possible solution in these cases and appear to be 
most effectively applied when assessed on products where the public bears the 
responsibility for disposal (e.g., nuclear fuels), or the products result in a significant 
public burden (e.g., construction of geological repositories). This also limits possible 
applications, although some applications remain for examination. 
 An intuitive application of environmental charges is in the context of toxic 
chemicals, hazardous waste, and other pollutants. For example, funding for the Superfund 
remains dependent upon appropriations from the General Fund (Government 
Accountability Office 2015). As a result, funding is tied to the policies and priorities of 
the current administration, as opposed to being driven by the real needs of the program. 
However, the Superfund Trust Fund Excise Taxes (see Section 3.2.2) offers a template 
for a historical program with demonstrated efficacy in funding the Superfund (Ramseur et 
al. 2008), although ensuring that appropriate green fees would not require periodic 
reauthorization may be a necessary. Examining pollution in a general sense also suggests 
the need for green fees. For example, there are long-standing connections between 
environmental quality and public health (Di et al. 2017; Jian et al. 2017). This connection 
strongly implies that government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid have 
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increased costs due to the poor environmental quality (e.g., air pollution) and a green fee 
allocating funds to Medicare and Medicaid may be appropriate, although a clear 
connection may not be obvious. 
 In contrast, a clear connection between an environmental assessment on cigarettes 
and the public's cost in cleaning up cigarette butts is obvious. Cigarette butts are 
frequently discarded as litter (Patel et al. 2013). However, the improper disposal of 
cigarette butts generates nonpoint pollution that can have a negative aesthetic impact on 
public spaces (ex., parks or beaches) (Novotny et al. 2009); or have a toxic effect upon 
wildlife when cigarette butts accumulate in waterways (Torkashvand et al. 2020). As a 
result of these externalities, governments incur a financial cost in cleaning up cigarette 
butts (Schneider et al. 2011). Environmental charges are an attractive policy instrument 
since there is a clear point-of-sale where they can be collected, but the complete life cycle 
of cigarettes commonly involves government intervention in disposing of the waste 
generated. This suggest an approach in which they would be assessed at time of sale with 
the proceeds deposited in a trust, with funds distributed to government agencies (e.g., 
local water boards) upon a demonstrable financial cost in remediating the impacts of 
cigarette butts (e.g., cost of additional filtration needed to capture cigarette butts during 
water treatment). In contrast to prior applications of green fees at the federal level in the 
United States, it is likely that the assessment of a green fee on cigarettes would be in line 
with the theoretical understanding of green fees (i.e., discouraging an externality 
generating activity) and would serve as a counterexample to this report. 
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 States are currently exploring environmental charges in the form of fees as a 
means of remediating electronic waste; however, a comprehensive plan for electronic 
waste management at the federal level is still needed (Elisha 2010; Westervelt & 
Beckham 2015). While the logistical management of electronic waste might be more 
appropriately managed at the state or municipal level, a federal policy may find fees set at 
a national level to be an effective means of funding program administration. National 
collections of fees may also help to mitigate long standing problems of interstate sales tax 
avoidance (Fox & Murray 1997), and funds could ultimately be redistributed to the states 
to support local collection and disposal. However, ensuring general public support for the 
program may be difficult due to the board application, despite suggestions that the public 
is willing to support fees and taxes connected to environmental issues (Agrawal et al. 
2010; Kallbekken & Sælen 2011). 
Ultimately these examples suggest that the application of environmental charges 
by policymakers may be limited.  While only a limited number of policies examined are 
suggestive of Pigouvian concepts underlying them, there is still considerable debate as to 
the efficacy of Pigouvian taxes to drive significant reductions in behaviors that result in 
negative externalities (Carlton & Loury 1980; Repetto 1996; Fleischer 2015). 
Accordingly, environmental charges should continue to be viewed by policymakers as a 
means of funding programs and remediation as opposed to a regulatory instrument that 
will result in behavioral change. While environmental charges are a noteworthy policy 
instrument to be considered during policy formulation, policymakers need to be aware of 
the limitations. 
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5. Conclusion 
Environmental charges are a form of Pigouvian taxes intended to correct environmental 
externalities. Clearly defined environmental taxes, such as carbon taxes implemented 
outside of the United States, make clear attempts to do this with changes being set at rates 
high enough to potentially alter behavior. In contrast, environmental charges 
implemented at the federal level in the United States are typically used to recover the 
government’s costs in addressing an environmental externality. Suggesting acceptance an 
environmental externality as the status quo.  
 In order to examine the premise of this report, fourteen policies were identified as 
possible environmental charges, of which six met the criteria for an environmental charge 
and two partially met the criteria. Each of these policies examined is characterized by 
features that establish them as environmental charges, but are either not designed to, or 
have rateswhose rates that are set too low to have any significant impact upon the 
creation of the relevant environmental externality. This stands in contradiction of the 
theoretical foundation for environmental taxes, supporting arguments that the United 
States implements environmental taxes as a means of recovering costs associated with 
clean-up.  
 Despite the current application of environmental charges at the federal level in the 
United States typically accepting the production environmental externalities as the status 
quo, they may still have some unity to policymakers. The restatement of the Superfund 
Trust Fund Excise Tax would serve to address continual issues with funding the 
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Superfund. Likewise, the enactment of a green fee on cigarettes to address the waste 
produced by cigarette butts could help address existing environmental concerns.  
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